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The Effect of Mortgage
Refinancing on Money Demand
and the Monetary Aggregates
ll~tONEY SERVES AS A medium of exchange
for transactions involving financial instruments
as well as real goods and services. Unfortunately,
the total volume of tt-ansactions iti the economy
is not observable. As a result, economic analyses
of rnomiev demand typically focus on the t-elation-
ship between the quantity of money demanded
and the production of new goods and services,
measured by either gross domestic product or
personal consumption expenditures. Because ag-
gregate volumes of financial and nonfinancial
transactions likely move in par~tllelwith the out-
put of new goods and services, the use of out-
put rather than the volume of transactions may
cost little in terms of understanding movements
in the monetary aggregates. In some periods,
however, events occur which remind us that
this is not always the case. This article examnines
the effect of one such ongoimig recent event—
the refinancimtg of residential mortgages—
on money demand.’
Simple models of the demand for money as a
medium of exchange often implicitly assume that
the purchase or sale of a good or service is com-
pleted within a relatively brief period. Unlike
the transactiomis in these models, the refinancing
of a r’esidential mortgage that has been securi-
tized in the secondary market initiates a sequence
of transactions that may continue for four to six
weeks, or niore. During this time, the quantity
of liquid deposits demanded increases. When the
last transactiomi in the sequence is concluded,
the quantity of deposits demanded falls back
ceterus paribas to its earlier level.
Mortgage refinancing is an important phenome-
non in the United States because most homes
are financed with long-term, fixed-rate amortized
mortgages that contain a ‘‘put’’ option, allowing
the horrower to repay the outstanding principal
amount of the loan at any time without penalt~’.
Homeownet-s typically exercise that option when
mortgage rates fall significantly (1-2 percentage
1Other recent examples include the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
which boosted household liquid deposits in late 1986 and
early 1987, and the closure of large numbers of thrifts by
the Resolution Trust Corporation. Recognizing that special
factors can significantly distort growth of the monetary ag-
gregates, the Bach commission recommended that the
Federal Reserve regularly undertake and publish studies of
the effects of special factors; see Report of the Advisory
Committee on Monetary Statistics (1976). The Bank of
England regularly publishes such analyses; see Pepper
(1992, 1993) and Topping and Bishop (1989).50
points) below recent previous levels by taking
out a new mortgage loan to repay the old.
As shown in figure 1,2 extensive mortgage re-
financing has occurred during two periods in
the last decade, 1986—87 and 199 1—93. In the
former, an initial surge in refinancing during
1986 was interrupted by a pause, before fears
of rising market rates launched a second round
in 1987. In the latter, three waves of refinancing
—of increasing magnitude—mirm’om’ed the halting
fall in long-term market interest rates. During
1992, for example, nearly one-fifth of all home-
owners refinanced their mortgages.3 In 1993,
the volume of refinancing activity will surpass
1992’s record pace.
The next section of this article describes the
changes in the growth and volatility of liquid
deposits and Ml that have occurred during
periods of extensive mortgage refinancing. The
article then examines the extent to which these
changes may be related to increases in mortgage
securitization. Finally, it explores whether recent
fluctuations in the growth of other checkable




The increases in liquid deposits that have ac-
companied accelem’ations in mortgage refinanc-
ing since mid-1990 are shown in figure 2. The
link betweemi mortgage refinancing and liquid
deposit growth is a stock adjustment process
wherein the stock of liquid deposits responds to
changes in the flow of m’efimiancings. When the
pace of mortgage refinancing increases, as it did
during late 1991, the third quarter of 1992 and
the second quarter of 1993, liquid deposit growth
accelerates. As refinancings continue at the
higher rate, deposit levels converge to the new
desired level and deposit growth slows. When
refinancing activity subsides—as in mid-1992
and early 1993—liquid deposit growth slows fur-
ther and deposits may run off.
Through its effect on liquid deposits, mortgage
refinancing sharply increased the volatility of
Ml during both 1986—87 and 1991—93, as shown
in figure 34 At the same time, the volatility of
the broadem’ aggregate M2, shown in figure 4,
apparently was only slightly affected. In large
part, the lower sensitivity of M2 to mortgage
refinancing reflects the much smaller share of
transaction deposits in M2 (about 20 percent)
than in Ml (about 70 percent). The small
changes that do appear in the volatility of M2
closely resemble changes in its non-MI com-
ponent.5
The ability of increases in mortgage m’efinancing
to affect the level and volatility of liquid deposits
and Ml is in part due to the borrowed reserves
operating procedure used by the Federal Reserve
to control the growth of M2. During the last de-
cade, this operating procedure has largely
evolved into one that closely stabilizes the feder-
al funds rate about a level thought to he consis-
tent with the desired amount of discount
window borrowing and the growth of M2. To
maintain the desired levels of the federal funds
rate and discount window borrowing, transitory
imicreases in the demand for reserves are auto-
matically accommodated with increases in the
supply of nonborrowed reserves.6
2ln the figure, the volume of refinancing activity is proxied
by liquidations of mortgage-backed securities, This concept
is explored further in this article.
3Nineteen percent of the homeowners interviewed in Fannie
Mae’s 1993 national housing survey had last refinanced
their mortgage between January 1992 and March 1993. An
additional 3 percent had refinanced during 1991 and 1990.
4The coefficient of variation shown in the figure equals the
ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of the series,
each calculated from the most recent 12 months of data,
The coefficient of variation indicates whether the variability
of the data has increased or decreased over time relative
to its average level.
5The volatility of M2 differs little from that of its non-MI
component. It is feasible that banks’ cash management
practices might account for the insensitivity of M2 volatility.
Increases in liquid deposits provide additional funds to
banks. If bank cash managers respond by reducing their
issuance of overnight repurchases (RPs), the change in the
volatility of M2 might be considerably less than that of Ml.
No such correlations between refinancing-related deposit
inflows and nontransaction funding sources are apparent in
the data, however.
6For an analysis of the borrowed reserves procedure and its
relationship to federal funds rate targeting, see Thornton
(1988). For a careful discussion of why and how reserves-
based targeting procedures evolve into federal funds rate
targets, see Meulendyke (1990).51
Figure 1
Mortgage Interest Rate and Refinancing Activity
Monthly data,January 1984-September 1993
Billions of dollars
** Liquidations of federal-agency-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities.
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Shaded areas are periods of heavy refinancing activity.53
THE ROLE OF MORTGAGE
SECURITIZATION
The increase in mortgage securitization during
the last decade has increased the potential for
mortgage refinancing to affect the growth of the
monetary aggregates.7 ‘The sale of mortgages in
the secondary market creates an additional finan-
cial instrument—the mortgage-backed security,
or NIBS—and involves a number of additional
firms in the mortgage process, including the
originators of the mortgages, the assembler of
the mortgage pool (who also issues the MBS5),
the servicer of the mortgage pool (who collects
monthly payments and disburses funds to inves-
tors) and, typically, at least one government
agency. The refinancing of securitized mortgages
thus beconies a circuitous calling and refunding
of relatively large amounts of long-term, publicly
held debt. Elevated levels of liquid deposits may
persist for four to six weeks or more, until all
related transactions are settled.
Legally, mortgage securitization entails com-
bining a fixed pool of mortgages imito a trust.
The mortgages serve as collateral for MBSs sold
against the trust. The servicer of the MBSs, as a
trustee, collects payments from homeowners
and passes them through without taxation to
the holders of the MBSs. Liquidity of the MBSs
is enhanced by obtaining a third-party guaran-
tee covering the payments that will be due to
investors if homeowners pay at the scheduled,
minimum contract rate. Three federal-govern-
mnent-sponsored enterprises, known as ‘agen-
cies,” dominate that business.t For a fee, these
agencies guarantee the payment of principal
and interest on securities backed by pools of
specified mortgages. The Government National
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae, or GNMA),
a part of the Department of Rousing and Urban
Development, guarantees payments on MBSs
backed by pools of Federal Housing Administra-
tion (Fl-IA) and Veterans Administration (VA)
mortgages. ‘T’he Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae, or FNMA), a federally
chartered, privately owned stock corporation,
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-
tion (Freddie Mac, or FHLMC), a wholly owned
subsidiat’y of the federally charter’ed Federal
1-lomne Loan Bank System, guarantee payments
on MUSs hacked by pools of conventional
mortgages.9
Absent refinancings or home sales, MBS in-
vestors receive a monthl payment that includes
the scheduled amortization of the pool’s mort-
gage principal plus the accumulated interest.
Refinancings, home sales and an occasional ex-
tra payment by a homeowner return additional
(or unscheduled) principal pro rata to the
holders of the MBSs backed by that mortgage
pool. The monthly liquidation for a mortgage
pool is the sunt of the scheduled and unscheduled
principal payments returned to investors. Note
that MBSs aren’t “called” in the traditional sense
associated with corporate bonds, hut rather are
only proportionately liquidated or repaid.
As shown in the upper panel of figure 5, the
outstanding stock of MBSs increased about six
fold during the last decade, much more rapidly
than Ml or M2. With few changes in mortgage
servicing rules and practices during the last
decade, the rapid growth of securitization sug-
gests that the transactions incurred in refinancing
securitized mortgages will have larger effects on
the monetary aggregates in the 1990s than they
did in the mid-I 980s. Annual liquidations of
MBSs, shown in the lower panel of the figure,
7See Duca (1990) for an analysis oftheinteractions between
demand deposits and mortgage refinancing during 1986—87.
°Asmall amount or MBSs is issued without agency guaran-
tees. Bank of America issued the first such private mort-
gage pool in 1977. In 1992, private mortgage pools
represented only 8 percent of all outstanding pools. For
background, see Downs (1985) and Pavel (1986).
°Theprecise nature of the guarantee varies somewhat by
agency. ONMA and FNMA guarantee timely (within the
month) payment of principal and interest, regardless of
payments by the borrower, FHLMC guarantees timely pay-
ment of interest and eventual (within the year) payment of
principal. In addition to issuing guarantees on MBSs backed
by privately assembled mortgage pools, FNMA and FHLMC
may purchase mortgages outright and market MBSs
backed by pools of those mortgages. In 1992, for example,
FNMA “issued” (guaranteed) $194 billion in MBSs. Ofthat
amount, about $13 billion were originated by FNMA itself;
the balance was originated by private lenders under a
FNMA guarantee plan. FNMA’s 1992 Annual Report em-
phasizes the off-balance-sheet contingent risk nature of
these securities: “MBS are not assets of the corporation
IFNMAI, except when acquired for investment purposes,
nor are the related outstanding securities recorded as lia-
bilities. However, the corporation is liable under its guaran-
tee to make timely payment of principal and interest to
investors. The issuance of MBSs creates guaranty fee in-
come with Fannie Mae assuming credit risk, but without
assuming any debt refinancing risk on the underlying

























































































































































































































































































have on balance increased in proportion to the
outstanding stock except for significant surges
during periods of refinancing. Annual liquida-
tions iumped to ahout 17 percent of the out-
standimig stock of Ntl3Ss during 1986—87 and 19
percent during 1991—92. More recently, liquida-
tions dut’ing June through September 1993
averaged nearly $44 billion a month, almost a
40 percent annual rate. Recent further decreases
111 mot1gage rates portend continuing high liqui-
dation rates during late 1993 and early ]994b0
‘I’he increase in deposits that follows an in-
ct-ease in mortgage refinancing activity may in
part he traced to the mechanics of mortgage
securitization and servicing. Mortgage servicers’
handling of the unscheduled principal payments
associated with refinancings is governed by the
rules of the federal agency that guam’antees the
MBSs issued against the mortgage pool. In gener-
al, these rules require that mortgage servicers
hold unscheduled principal payments in special
custodial accounts during the interval between
receipt from homeowners and disbursement to
NIBS investors. GNMA requires that these cus-
todial accounts be non-interest-bearing demand
deposits. FNMA allows funds to he held in
interest-bearing accounts as long as they are imn-
mediately available without prior notice of with-
dra’1val. FFILMC’s rules are similar to ENMA’s.
A surge in refinancing greatly increases the
monthly average amount of funds held in liquid
deposits by a mortgage servicer. In a typical
month without refinancing, a set-vicer holds a
homeowner’s mortgage payment for a relatively
brief period of time (up to 15 days) before
remittance to investors. Following a mortgage
refinancing, however, the servicer will hold the
unpaid principal balance of the extinguished
mortgage loan—an amount perhaps 10 to 100
(or- more) times as large as the homeowner’s
regular monthly principal payment—in a cus-
todial account for a much longer period, often
two to six weeks (see the shaded insert).”
Estimates of the size of this effect on monthly
growth rates of demand deposits, Ml and M2,
are shown in figure 6.12 When MBS liquidations
accelerate, the growth rates of demand deposits
and Ml after removing the MI3S effect are
smaller than the published growth rates. Con-
ver’selv, when MBS liquidations slow, the NIBS-
adjusted growth rates are larger than the pub-
lished rates. Overall, the estimated differences
in growth rates equal in some months as mnuch
as one-half of the change in MI. F’rom Decemher
1991 to March 1992, for example, inflows to
mortgage servicers’ custodial accounts are esti-
mated to have added hetween 5 to 10 percentage
poitils to the monthly growth rates of demand
deposits. ‘l’he largest estimated effects were in
October 1992 and May 1993, when MUS-related
inflows likely accounted for four-fifths and
three-fifths, respectively, of demand deposit
growth. In both cases, deposit growth slowed
sharply in later months when deposit levels had
increased enough to support the accelera ted
pace of mnortgage activity. Subsequemitly, during
the first quarter of 1993, runoffs of servicers’
custodial balances likely depressed monthly
average deposit growth by as much as 10 per-
centage points.
‘these patterns show through to Ml (see the
center panel of figure 6) but are muted. Curren-
cy and OCDs, which comprise two-thirds of Nil,
are unlikely to he affected by MBS activity.”
Nonetheless, the distortions to demand deposits
are sufficient that monthly growth rates of MI
since mid-1992 appear to ha~•’ebeen distorted
by as much as 5 to 7 percentage IJoints. Similar
estimates for M2 that include estimated effects
on money market demand account (MMDA)
balances are shown in the hottormi panel of the
figure.
Overall, fluctuations in mortgage servicers’
ttWhile it is always risky to forecast financial market activity,
recent decreases in mortgage rates (through October 1993)
are likely to trigger substantial further increases in re-
financing and MBS activity during late 1993 and early
1994. In addition to older mortgages issued during the
1980s, mortgages that were issued as little as 12 to 18
months ago at 7 to 7-112 percent rates now may profitably
be refinanced. Rather than the pace of refinancing slowing
and related distortions to the monetary aggregates diminish-
ing as the outstanding stock of seasoned MBSs are rolled
over, recent rate decreases have placed nearly the entire
outstanding stock of MBSs “in the money” for rollover.
1tHomeowners typically make monthly mortgage payments
between the 1st and 15th of the month, with the servicer
ing a refinancing, the funds received by the servicer from
the homeowner (at any time within the month) are placed
in a custodial account, These funds are remitted by the
servicer to MBS investors after the middle of the following
month. The exact date, however, depends on the contract
specifications of the agency guarantee program under
which the M8Ss backed by the mortgage pool that con-
tained the extinguished mortgage were issued, See, for ex-
ample, Karcher (1989).
“Construction of these estimates is discussed in the ap-
pendix.
“The next section raises the possibility that OCD balances
also might have been affected by refinancing since 1991,
remitting these funds to M6S investors on the 15th. Follow- albeit not through MBS-related transactions.56
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custodial deposits likely account for about one- els. Also omitted are any increases in liquid
half of the i ect nt increase in Ml volatility It is deposits that arise because of the stgnificant
unlikely that these estimates ate too large, since volume of additional transactions used to pur-
they are based on legal restrictions imposed on chase and sell large qu-intities of mortgages and
mortgage servicers by federal agencies and NIBS.
realistic but conservative assumptions regat ding
intra month patterns of mortgage closings and HOUSEHOLD DEPOSITS AND
deposit behavior.
REFINANCING
The estimates may be biased dot~nwaid,
however, for a number of reasons. The most In addition to demand deposits, changes in
nportant perhaps is the omission ot any in OCDs since mid-1991 also have reflected the
crease in deposits held by issuers of new MBSs. ebbs and flows in the pace of mortgage
As some issuers draw on bank warehouse refinancing (ste the upper panel of figure 7).
credit lines to fumJd the purchase of mortgages I lie apparent increase in the correlation of
to be assembled into new MBS pools, they may Of Ds with demand deposits contrasts with its
offs.t part of the hank charges for these lines behavior before 1991 and during 1986—87, the
via earnings credits ha ed on their deposit let’ latter shown in the lower panel of figut e 7.57
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Should some poi-tion of the OCD fluctuations to mortgage activity is necessar ilv less direct
during 1991—93 be attributed to mortgage re- and more circumstantial than that for demand
financing activity? If so, and if the impact of re- deposits. I racing direct links between house-
financtng on OCUs were similar to its effect on hold deposits and economic activity is generally
demand deposits, then their combined effects not possible, since the Federal Reser~ e collects
could account for as much as three-quarters of deposit data from the issuers of deposits such as
Ml’s growth during a number ol months since banks and thrifts rather than from the o~net s of
1991. deposits, including households and firms.”
Ihe recent parallel monthly movements in Why might a household increase its OC I)
these two types of liquid accounts i- compelling balances following a mortgage refinancin~QOne
hut puzzling. Any ct idence linking these deposits possibility could be thc convt m sion of home eq
“Although the Federal Reserve Boards flow of funds ac- for firms and government. See Guide to the Flow of Funds
counts present a fairly complete balance sheet for the Accounts, p. 120
household sector, few items are directly observed Most en-
tries are calculated as residuals, interred from the double-
entry nature of the accounts and from balance sheet data58
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uity into cash at the time of refinancing. If
operative, this factor should be much stronger
during the 1990s than during 1986—87, for two
reasons. First, many households have been res-
tructuring their balance sheets, seeking to reduce
the levels of debt (and debt service) that they
took on during the 1980s. Flomne equity convert-
ed to cash at refinancing allows them to repay
other outstanding debt and reduce monthly
debt service. Second, households generally ex-
perienced large capital gains on houses during
the 1980s. For many, capital gains in housing
appeared largely as a windfall, accruing mom-c
rapidly than had been anticipated when the
home was purchased and without any overt ef-
fort by the homeowner. As such, these in-
creases in wealth likely were not optimally
deployed (from a portfolio standpoint) across all
household asset categories. For other home-
owners who nught have preferred to consume
the increased wealth rather than save it, the
capital gain appears as a type of forced saving
in the form of home equity. While a home equi-
ty loan may increase the liquidity of home equi-
ty, it doesn’t permit the household to consume a
windfall increase in home equity, since the loan
must be repaid. Flence, there may be some
pent-up demand by homeowners for redirecting
part of their home equity toward balance sheet
restructuring (reducing other consumer debt),
consumption or perhaps redeployment into
more liquid assets.
Although no direct data on cash withdrawals
at mortgage refinanciugs are available, recent
evidence is supportive. Fannie Mae’s 1993 na-
tional housing survey asked households whether
their primary motivation in refinancing was to
shorten the maturity of the loan (thereby build-
ing equity more quickly) or to reduce their
monthly payments. While a shorter maturity
was the motive more frequently stated, in fact
at refinancing more households tended to forego
a shorter maturity in favor of lower monthly
payments, consistent with reducing the impor-
tance of home equity in their portfolios. (Unfor-
tunately, the survey did not ask about the
withdrawal of home equity at refinancing.)
Home equity lending at banks, shown in figure
8, also has been weak since mid-1991, with
reports suggesting that homeowners are indeed
repaying outstanding home equity loans with
cash withdrawn at the time of a mortgage
refinancing.
While the growth in OCDs likely reflects
changes in households’ deposits, some profes-
sionals and small businesses also may account
for a portion of the increase. Some real estate
payment practices tend to increase the demand
for OCDs when mortgage activity increases. I’he
1969 Truth in Lending Act, for example, im-
plemented through the Federal Reserve’s Regu-
lation Z, requires a three-day, right-of-rescission
period for any new credit transaction secured
by the borrower’s principal residence.’~During
this period, settlement agents typically hold
funds in a liquid deposit, or perhaps in the
form of cashier’s and officers’ checks. If the
funds are held solely for the beneficial interest
of the household, they may he placed in an
OCD account.’°Cashier’s and officers’ checks
issued by banks are included as demand deposits
in Ml, while such checks issued by thrifts typi-
cally are included in OCDs.
This supportive yet largely circumstantial evi-
dence leaves a number of unanswered questions.
If a household extracts funds at refinancing to
repay a home equity loan, how long will it keep
the funds in a liquid deposit? And isn’t the
amount of funds almost surely far smaller than
the amounts held by mortgage servicers, associ-
ated with MBS refunding activity? If so, can the
“These provisions do not apply to home purchases, nor to
refinancings with the same lender for an amount equal to
or less than the unpaid principal balance. The Act exempts
from right-of-rescission provisions residential mortgage
transactions’ which are defined in the Act as extensions of
credit to acquire a principal residence. In May 1987, at the
request of mortgage market participants, refinancings with
the same lender were exempted from Regulation Z. At the
time, it was felt that this change likely would significantly
reduce the number of refinancings subject to right-of-
rescission provisions.
160n the eligibility of lawyers to hold a client’s funds in OCD
deposits, see section 2-341 of the Fed’s Regulation 0 in
Federal Reserve Regulatory Service (1993). Client funds
also may be placed in MMDA deposits, although the rul-
ings contained in section 2-341 perhaps suggest a prefer-
ence to hold the funds as OCOs. OCDs have no restrictions
on the number of third-party withdrawals per month. While
both OCDs and MMDA deposits are included in M2, data
on MMDAs have not been collected by the Federal
Reserve System since September 1990. Banks and thrifts
began reporting that month only a combined total for all
savings and MMDA deposits. Hence, no separate analysis
of MMDA deposits is shown in this article.61
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increasingly parallel movements in OCDs reason-
ably he attributed to refinancing activity? On
balance, while the sharp increase in the correla-
tion between the changes in OCDs and demand
deposits since 1991 suggests an underlying rela-
tionship to mortgage refinancing, the magnitude
of any effect on the monetary aggregates remains
uncertain and a convincing explanation elusive.
SUMMARY
Any factors that increase the demand for trans-
action deposits can distort the growth of the
monetary aggregates over significant periods of
time. Recent waves of mortgage refinancing ac-
tivity have caused significant fluctuations in li-
quid deposits and Ml. Under current Federal
Reserve operating procedures for controlling the
growth of M2, such transitory changes in the
demand for liquid deposits, like those associated
with mortgage refinancing, at-c automatically ac-
commodated through changes in bank reserves,
leading to increased volatility of Ml -
A large portion of this increased volatility of
demand deposits can be traced to fiduciary
rules governing the custodial accounts of mort-
gage servicers. The mechanism generating
parallel high-frequency movements in OCDs,
however, is far less clear. The coincidence of its
timing with changes in refinancing activity and
the onset of unusual weakness in home equity
lending in 1992 suggest that it may be related
to the ongoing restt’uctur’ing of household
balance sheets during the 1990s.
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Estimates of Mortgage Servicers’ Custodial
Account Balances
This appendix employs methodology suggested
by Duca (1990) to estimate the impact of re-
financing on the amount of liquid deposits held
by mortgage servicers.1 At refinancing, the out-
standing principal of an extinguished securitized
mortgage is returned to the mortgage servicer.
Following rules established by the federal agency
that guaranteed the MI3Ss issued against the pool
containing the mortgage, servicers place incom-
ing unscheduled payments in custodial accounts
(liquid deposits) until remnitted to the holders of
the MBSs around the middle of the following
month. Since the servicing rules of the three
agencies differ, the overall increase in custodial
deposits that follows an increase in refinancing
depends on the agency composition of MBS liq-
uidations. Differences in this composition during
1991—93 relative to earlier periods have attenu-
ated the deposit impact of recent MBS liquida-
tions from what might have been expected.
GNMA-guaranteed issues made up about one-
half of aggregate liquidations during 1986—87,
for example, hut only one-quarter in 1991—93.
The largest volumne of liquidations during
1991—93, on balance, has been FFILMC issues
that have a smaller impact, dollar for dollar, on
liquid deposits than liquidations of GNMA- or
FNMA-guaranteed MBS.
‘the increase in liquid deposits due to MRS liq-
uidations is estimated from a simple simulation.
The parameters are’:
The proportion of MRS liquidations during a
month that result from scheduled amortization
of principal (not-rn hq}. Separation of sched-
uled from unscheduled payments mailers for
reasons explained in the text. Estimates in this
article assume that scheduled principal pay-
ments equal 1 percent tat an annual rate) of the
outstanditig stock of MBSs.2
The average number of days, expressed as a pro-
portion of the month, that unscheduled principal
payments are held in custodial accounts during
the month in which the refinancing occurred
(GNMA this rnonth, FNMA ~,. this
‘The model in this appendix differs from Duca’s in some
respects, including assuming a more uniform rate of mort-
gage closings during each month and that funds remain in
liquid deposits somewhat longer during the month follow-
ing the refinancing before they are withdrawn by investors.
2The exact monthly scheduled amortization rate is a func-
tion of the outstanding balances, rates and terms on the
mortgages in the pool. Such calculations require extensive
databases well beyond the scope of this study. An alterna-
tive set of estimates that assumed scheduled monthly
amortization equal to 2 percent of outstanding aggregate
principal had a relatively large number of months wherein
actual principal payments were less than estimated sched-
uled payments and, hence, was rejected as implausible.63
month, FHLMC this — month). Payments
received by servicers early in the month have
larger impacts on month-average deposit levels
than payments received late in the month.
Herein it is assumed that mortgages close at a
uniform rate during the month. Under this as-
sumption, the weighted average holding period
for payments received by GNMA and FNMA
ser\’icers is 0.50 months, i.e., GiMVIA — this
month — ENMA — this month = 0.50. for
FHLMC serviccrs, who generally hold unsche-
duled principal payments for five days or less,
an average holding period of 0.15 months is
assumed,
The average number of days, expressed as a pro-
portion of the month, that funds due to MRS
investors are held in liquid deposits during the
month following the refinancing (GNMA last
month, FNMA last — month). Under
GNMA and FNMA servicing rides, unscheduled
principal payments received by servicers during
the preceding month are remitted to investors
on the 15th and 18th of the current month, te-
spectively. Funds may be on deposit longer if
investors do not withdraw them immediately.
Values of 20 days and 23 days, corresponding
to GNMA last — month = 0.67 and FIVIvIA
last month 0.77, are used in the calcula-
tions below. These somewhat longer periods
wet-c suggested by examination of daily deposit
data reported to the Federal Reserve by sever-al
large banks. For FHLMC, this is set equal to
zero,
For l”NMA servicers, the proportion of incom-
ing funds placed in MMDAs rather than demand
deposits (IVIA’IDA share). A value of 0.25 is as-
sumed below,’ Funds in MMUAs are assumed to
remain on deposit for the same nutnber of days
as funds placed in demand deposit accounts.
Monthly liquidation of GNMA-guaranteed MBSs
equals, by definition, the amount of GNMA-
guaranteed MRSs issued during the month minus
the change in the amount of GNMA-guaranteed
MBSs outstanding as of the end of each month:
liq (JNMA — iss — AGi\~\4A — sth.
In turn, the amnount of unscheduled principal pay-
amount of GNMA-guaranteed MBSs outstanding
at the end of the previous month:
GNMA — on = GNMJI lit; — norm — lit; *
GNMA stk — lag.
Liquidations and unscheduled principal pay-
ments for FNMA and FHLMC are calculated in
the same manner.
‘I’he amount of demand deposits that are cus-
todial account balances due to GNMA mortgage
servicers is calculated as:
VIA — dda = GNMA this — month *Gj\TMA
— on + GNMA — last month *GNMA on
— lag.
For FNMA servicers, the amount is:
FNMA — dc/a = (1 -MMIJA share) *(FNMA —
this — month * FNMA — on + FNMA /ast
— month *FNMA tin lag);
and for- FHLMC it is:
FHLMC — dda = FHLMC — this month *
FF-JLMC — on
A similar calculation is made for’ the holdings of
MMDAs by FNMA servicer-s.
An MRS-adjusted, not seasonally adjusted
(n.s.a.) demand deposit series is obtained by
subtracting the sum (GNMA — dda + ENMA —
dda + FHLMC — dda) from published n.s.a.
monthly levels of demand deposits. The resulting
demand deposit series is seasonally adjusted us-
ing the seasonal factors for demand deposits
published by the Federal Reserve Board staff in
Money Stock Revisions (1993). (Seasonal factors
are recovered from the published data by divid-
ing the n.s.a. level by the s.a. level.) The differ-
ences in growth rates of demand deposits and
MI shown in the upper two panels of figure 6
are calculated from published and these adjust-
ccl data.
An MBS-adjusted, non-MI component of M2 is
obtained by subtracting the estimated amount
of MRS-related MMDA deposits from the pub-
lished, seasonally adjusted. non-MI component
of 212. (Since the non-MI component of M2 is
seasonally adjusted by the Federal Reserve
Board staff as a whole, and separate data on
MMFJA are not available, the seasonally adjusted
series was adjusted liv MRS effects.) The growth
rates shown in the lower panel of figure 6 are
calculated from published M2 and from the sum






to equal the liquidations of
MRSs minus 1 percent of the
‘The value of 0.25 is from Duca (1990).